Scientific publications

А.М. Писарева, Е.М. Парилина.

Приближенное равновесие в конечно повторяющейся игре «Дилемма заключенного»

// Математическая Теория Игр и ее Приложения, т. 16, в. 2. 2024. C. 45-65

Alena M. Pisareva, Elena M. Parilina. Approximate equilibrium in a finitely repeated "Prisoner’s Dilemma" // Mathematical game theory and applications. Vol 16. No 2. 2024. Pp. 45-65

Keywords: repeated games, prisoner’s dilemma, approximate equilibrium, trigger strategy

The paper studies finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. To maintain cooperation in the game, a new profile of behavioral strategies is proposed, where the deviation of a player is not punished until the end of the game, but for a given number of stages depending on the stage of the game. The existence of an approximate equilibrium in these strategies is proven, and the maximum value of benefit of a player deviating from the approximate equilibrium is found.

Indexed at RSCI, RSCI (WS)

vol16_2_45_pisareva.pdf (411 Kb, total downloads: 52)

Last modified: July 10, 2024